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RECENT CASES
EMPLOYERS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS DURING
UNION ORGANIZATIONAL CAMPAIGNS-NLRB v. Lenkurt
Electric, 438 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1971).
In NLRB v. Lenkurt Electric,1 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated that debate in union campaigns should be
vigorous and uninhibited, and held that it would not uphold an order
by the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as
the Board) which unduly restrains an employer's right to speak
during a union organizational campaign. Unless such speech is in
fact coercive or threatening, it is constitutionally protected by the
first amendment.2
The Pressmen's Union3 petitioned the Board to hold an elec-
tion4 for certification as representative of the fourteen employees in
Lenkurt Electric's printing department. After an initial hearing,
the Board granted the request and subsequently held an election
which the union lost by a vote of seven-to-five.' The union then
filed a charge with the Board alleging that the company committed
an unfair labor practice. The specific charge leveled at the company
concerned the conduct of Kenneth Linka, manager of Lenkurt's
printing department. Linka had expressed views concerning the
union which were allegedly threatening and therefore violative of
section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act which pro-
hibits employers from interfering with certain guaranteed employ-
1 438 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1971).
2 438 F.2d at 1108.
The exercise of free speech in [labor organizational] campaigns should not be
unduly restricted by narrow construction. It is highly desirable that the
employees involved in a union campaign should hear all sides of the questionin order that they may exercise the informed and reasoned choice that is their
right.
3 San Francisco & Vicinity Printing Pressmen Offset Workers & Assistants' Union
No. 24, International Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union of North America, a
division of the AFL-CIO.
4 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1970). Section 9(c) states in pertinent part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed . . . [by a] . . . labor organization
... alleging that a substantial number of employees (1) wish to be representedfor collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their
representative ... ; the Board shall investigate such petition and . . . providefor any appropriate hearing .... If the Board finds upon the record of suchhearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an electionby secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
5 438 F.2d at 1104. There were fourteen eligible voters and all fourteen voted.
Two of the ballots were effectively challenged. Because a majority of employees is
required for certification, the challenged ballots were insufficient to affect the result of
the election.
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ees' rights.6 After an initial investigation, the Board issued a com-
plaint against Lenkurt charging the company with interference of
its employees' guaranteed right to form, join, or assist the labor
organization of their choice.'
At the initial trial, the examiner' held that Linka's speech re-
specting unionization constituted fair comment and was little more
than a prediction of unfavorable consequences. He recommended
to the Board that the union's complaint be dismissed.'" However,
the Board, after reviewing the examiner's decision, found Linka's
statements to be violative of 8(a) (1) and therefore not constitu-
tionally protected."
Lenkurt then appealed to the court of appeals which reversed
the Board's order.' The court found all of the alleged threatening
statements to be within the broad purview of section 8(c) of the
Act, 3 which states:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat or
reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
14
6 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1970). Section 8(a) (1) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(i) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title....
7 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act
[hereinafter referred to as the Act] guarantees to employees "the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations .... "
8 The trial examiner presides at the initial trial. He is basically the equivalent of a
trial judge except his opinion is only in the form of a recommendation to the Board
rather than a binding decision.
9 169 N.L.R.B. 941 (1968).
The most that can be said is that there is some evidence that Linka was
opposed to the unionization of the unit employees . . . a not uncommon
phenomenon, and hardly enough to indicate a strong antiunion animus, much
less enough on which to base a conclusion [of] unfair labor practices ....
At most, the testimony reveals that Linka expressed doubt that the ... Union
could adequately represent the employees . . . . Such sentiments, however,
are shielded by Section 8(c) of the Act, for it is not an unfair labor practice
to dislike or oppose a union or to state one's reasons for feeling so. General
hostility to unions, without more, does not supply an unlawful motive. Id. at
957-58.
1O Id. at 962.
11 169 N.L.R.B. 941, 943 (1968). The Board issued a cease and desist order, set
aside the election, and ordered that a new election be held when the circumstances
would permit the employees to make a free choice.
12 438 F.2d at 1108.
13 Id. "The statements of Linka do not justify the strained interpretation given
them by the Board, but were within the protection of the free speech provisions of
the First Amendment, as implemented by section 8(c) . ... "
14 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (1970). Section 8(c) is merely an implementation of the first amendment.
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This note will analyze the Lenkurt opinion in terms of its im-
pact on the scope of protected speech afforded employers during a
union organizational campaign. In order to fully appreciate the
import and possible ramifications of the Lenkurt decision, it is
necessary to view the background from which it arose.
AN EMPLOYER'S SPEECH RESTRICTED
Freedom of speech has historically occupied a "preferred
position" within the hierarchy of rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. 5 While conceding that such a right is not absolute, courts
have suspiciously scrutinized any statutory restrictions which may
impede speech.' Within the context of a union organizational
campaign, the validity of such an inviolate right as freedom of
speech has been the focal point of a tremendous amount of litigation.
In 1947, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act by
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.' 7 Section 8(c), a provision of the
Act, embodied the principle that an employer and a union are en-
titled to the same first amendment protection in regard to any ex-
pression made by them during an organizational campaign.' Since
both parties' rights inhere from the first amendment, the scope of
permissible speech must be identical for both.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969); NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co.,
178 F.2d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 340 U.S. 810 (1950). But see Dal Tex
Optical Company, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962) wherein the Board apparently made
a distinction between 8(c) and the first amendment.
Congress specifically limited Section 8(c) to the adversary proceedings in-
volved in unfair labor practice cases and it has no application to representation
cases . .. . [However, the] strictures of the first amendment, to be sure,
must be considered in all cases. Id. at 1787.
If 8(c) is merely an implementation of the first amendment, which must be applied
in all cases, then it is an inherent contradiction to exclude employer preelection state-
ments from 8(c) protections in representation cases.
15 See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937). See also Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 90-96 (1949) (Frankfurter concurring) (critically tracing the evolution
of speech with respect to its "preferred position") ; Richardson, Freedom of Expression
and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1951-52).
16 For example, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "The decisions of this
Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms." Id. at 438. See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). "When we deal with the complex of strands
in the web of freedoms which make up free speech, the operation and effect of
the method by which speech is sought to be restrained must be subjected to close
analysis and critical judgment in the light of the particular circumstances to which it
is applied." Id. at 520.
17 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 et seq. (1970).
18 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538 (1944), which is discussed infra note
68. An employer's speech is "entitled to the same protection" as the "espousal of any
other lawful cause." For a modern application of this same notion, see Boaz Spinning
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In 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co.,19 affirmed the proposition that 8(c) is merely
an application of the first amendment in the context of a labor
relations setting.' However, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a
unanimous court, tempered this proposition, by prescribing a special
standard for evaluating an employer's speech when cast as a pre-
diction. A recapitulation of the relevant facts is important in order
to understand the bases of the Gissel standard.
In Gissel, the petitioner Sinclair Company challenged the hold-
ing of the Board2 and the First Circuit Court of Appeals.' David
Sinclair2" had made an intensive effort to dissuade his employees
Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1971). "[N]or is the right to free speech to be
unequally applied as between employers and labor unions. 'There is no basis for
adopting a narrow restrictive rule for one party and a liberal one for the other.'"
Id. at 878.
19 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel was a consolidation of four cases. NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966), enforced as modified 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 186 (1967), enforced as modified 398
F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 157 N.L.R.B. 636
(1966), enforced as modified, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Sinclair Co.,
164 N.L.R.B. 261 (1967), enforced as modified, 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). This note
will deal exclusively with the Sinclair portions of the Gissel case. It will not deal with
the following aspects of Gissel: (1) The employer's obligation to bargain with a union
without a representation election; (2) Reliability of authorization cards as indicators
of employee preferences; (3) The Board's power to issue mandatory bargaining orders
once the employer commits an unfair labor practice and the probability of a fair
election is eliminated. See, Browne and Sachs, The Suppression of Employer Free
Speech-A New Ban on "Conscious Overstatements" and a Caveat Against "Brinkman-
ship," 15 ViL. L. REV. 588 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Browne and Sachs]; Chris-
tensen and Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt": The Gestalt of
Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. Ci. L. REV. 411 (1969-70);
Comment, Establishing a Labor Representative: Authorization Cards and Employer
Free Speech, 50 B.U.L. Rxv. 111 (1969); Note, Bargaining Orders and Employee Free
Choice, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 318 (1970); Comment, Authorization Cards Held To Be a
Legitimate Alternative to an NLRB Election When a Fair Election is Improbable
Because of Employer's Unfair Labor Practices, 2 RUTcERs-CAm'DEN L.J. 201 (1970);
21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 305 (1970); 1969 DUKE L.J. 1075 (1969); 38 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 319 (1969); 83 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1969-70); 30 LA. L. REV. 526 (1970); 35
Mo. L. REV. 565 (1970); 4 Su-FOLK U.L. REV. 160 (1969); 21 SYRAcusE L. REV. 337
(1969); 43 TFmp. L.Q. 104 (1969-70); 5 VAL.. L. REV. 178 (1970).
Some articles dealing with the employer's right of free speech prior to Gissel are:
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38 (1964-65); Burke, Employer Free
Speech, 26 FORDHAm L. REV. 266 (1957-58); Koretz, Employer Interference with
Union Organization versus Employer Free Speech, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1960-
61) ; Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the NLRA, 25 MD. L. Rav. 111 (1965) ;
Wollet and Rowan, Employer Free Speech and Related Issues, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 40
(1968-69); Note, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 207 (1964).
20 395 U.S. at 617.
21 Sinclair Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 261 (1967).
22 NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
23 President of Sinclair Company of Holyoke, Massachusetts. The company had
recently merged with Lindsay Wire Weaving Company in an effort to stave off bank-
ruptcy.
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from joining the Teamsters Union. He conversed in small groups
with all the employees during the period preceding the election. He
explained that because the company was financially on "thin ice,"
any sort of strike would denigrate their position with Lindsay Wire
Weaving Company, the parent corporation, and probably lead to a
plant closure.24 Sinclair did not respect the Teamsters and was quite
outspoken in expressing his prejudices. 25 Sinclair's anti-union efforts
included two major speeches,26 several personal letters addressed to
each employee,27 and dispersion of leaflets at the plant.28 He also
spoke with ten of the fourteen employees individually. 2 The gist
of all these communications was that the Teamsters are "strike-
happy," dominated by hoodlums, and would impose unreasonable
demands which the company could not meet. ° If the company
closed, Sinclair warned, the employees would be hard pressed to
find comparable work.81 However, it appears that Sinclair had
assured the employees that he "would not close the plant in re-
taliation for employees voting for a union."" The Supreme Court
was persuaded that Sinclair's speech was "not cast as a prediction
of 'demonstrable probable consequences' but rather as a threat of
retaliatory action."' Chief Justice Warren reasoned that Sinclair's
fear of excessive union demands did not satisfy the requisite burden
of proving that his statements were justified. 4
24 395 U.S. at 588-89.
25 Id. For example, in one letter addressed to his employees, "Sinclair devotes
three pages to informing the employees that the Teamsters Union is involved with
'serious crimes,' 'racketeering,' 'hoodlum domination,' 'shocking misdeeds,' 'goon squads,'
'threats to run down children,' and 'unlawful acts.'" 164 N.L.R.B. at 264.
26 Synopses of the first and second speeches are noted at 164 N.L.R.B. 263, 265
respectively.
27 Excerpts and explanation of the letters noted at 164 N.L.R.B. 263-65.
28 Id. at 265.
29 Id.
30 For a complete recital of the facts, see 395 U.S. at 587-90. The unreasonable
demands which Sinclair referred to are not mentioned in the facts. Presumably this
was merely Sinclair's opinion based on prior experience with unions.
31 Id. at 588. "Because of their age and the limited usefulness of their skills out-
side the craft, the employees might not be able to find re-employment .... " See also
164 N.L.R.B. at 265, which states:
'[W]e are all Jack Benny's,' with no one admitting that he is getting older;
some of the wire weavers were over 60 years old, which is a difficult time in
life to start over again; 'most companies probably have a large number of
applicants who are younger and better experienced,' with 'a lot better insurance
rating,' who 'could be hired for less money .... 
32 NLRB v. Lenkurt Electric, 438 F.2d 1111 (dissenting opinion), quoting Browne
and Sachs, supra note 19, at 605.
33 395 U.S. at 619. The Board set aside the election which the union lost by a
vote of 7-6. It also entered a cease and desist order and ordered the company to
bargain with the union.
34 395 U.S. at 618. The Chief Justice saw "no need to tamper" with "the
standards used below for evaluating the impact of an employer's statements." An
examination of the standards used below reveals that the employer had the burden
of proving that his remarks were justified (NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d at 161).
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Out of the above factual situation emerged the Gissel stan-
dard. 5 The Chief Justice began by stating that during a union
organizational campaign all communications must be viewed in the
context of the employer-employee relationship."6 When an employ-
er's speech is in the form of a prediction, he is permitted to state
only what he reasonably believes to be the probable economic con-
sequences of unionization.87 Such belief, in order to be reasonable,
must be founded on "objective fact," "carefully phrased," and
based on matters beyond his personal control. 8 Note that an em-
ployer's predictions are limited to probable economic consequences. 9
The logical purport of this statement is to eliminate predictions
based on societal, political, or any sort of noneconomic considera-
tions.
The inherent difficulty of the Gissel standard becomes instantly
obvious. Warren conditioned an employer's right to speak during
a union organizational campaign so that failure to comport with
this newly articulated standard is per se an unlawful practice.
Though he permits an employer to make a reasonable subjective
But see the trial examiner's opinion in Lenkurt Electric Co., 169 N.L.R.B. at 958.
"[T]he burden of proving that the employer has acted unlawfully rests upon the
General Counsel [of the Board]." Accord, NLRB v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 441 F.2d 765
(5th Cir. 1971). "It is incumbent upon the General Counsel of the Board to prove
unlawful conduct and an unlawful purpose is not lightly to be inferred . . . . 'ITihe
record taken as a whole must present a substantial basis of believable evidence pointing
toward the unlawful one.'" Id. at 770.
35 395 U.S. at 618:
[An employer] may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes
unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however, the prediction
must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an em-
ployer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control
or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in
case of unionization .... If there is any implication that an employer may
or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to
economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a
reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of retaliation based
on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without the protection of the
First Amendment. (Emphasis added).
36 Id. at 617.
37 id. at 618. In the landmark case of Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the Supreme Court established that an
employer has an absolute right to go out of business for any reason, including union
animus. The Darlington rule was expressly affirmed in Gissel wherein the Court stated
that an employer may "convey a management decision already arrived at to close
the plant in case of unionization." Id. at 618. Thus, only when the employer predicts
that the plant will close in the event of unionization must he comply with the Gissel
prediction standard, which, according to Chief Justice Warren, is in this instance,
rarely capable of proof. Id. at 618-619. Therefore, an employer who is well trained
in Supreme Court decisional law can easily circumvent the Gissel standard by announc-
ing, rather than predicting, that he will exercise his lawful right to go out of business
if the union wins.
38 Id. at 618.
39 Id.
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statement respecting the effects of unionization," Warren proceeds
to implicitly define reasonableness with respect to predictions. Unless
based on "objective fact," "carefully phrased," and economically
necessary, a prediction fails to achieve the necessary level of reason-
ableness required by the Gissel standard.4' The Court also denied
Sinclair's very real argument that the line the Court had just drawn
between permitted predictions and proscribed threats was uncon-
stitutionally vague.4
In the terminology of the classics, Gissel presented the Court with a
Rubicon which, like Caesar, it could either ford or merely survey as to
possible future crossings.... It is no criticism of the Court to state
that it chose not to be a Caesar.43
Indeed, if classical terminology must be used to describe the
Court's decision in Gissel, Marcus Brutus' betrayal of Caesar seems
to be a more appropriate analogy. 4 Not only did the Court fail to
articulate an adequate standard, the one it advocated is no less than
a constitutional betrayal. The mechanical framework innovated by
the Chief Justice pertaining to what does and does not constitute an
acceptable prediction runs afoul of the notion that first amendment
freedoms apply equally to all persons in our society, irrespective
of their particular status in the business world.45
40 "[An employer is free only to tell 'what he reasonably believes will be the
likely economic consequences of unionization that are outside his control . . . .'" Id.
at 619. Chief Justice Warren also explained the factors that should be considered in
evaluating a labor relations setting. "[T]ake into account the economic dependence
of the employees on their employers," and recognize that an employee might tend to
pick up hidden implications "that might be more readily dismissed by a more dis-
interested ear." Id. at 617.
41 Id. at 618.
42 The Supreme Court expressly dismissed Sinclair's argument that the "line
between so-called permitted predictions and proscribed threats is too vague to stand
up under traditional First Amendment analysis .... ." According to the Chief Justice,
the employer could "easily make his views known without engaging in 'brinkmanship'"
and "he can avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding conscious overstatements he has
reason to believe will mislead his employees." Id. at 620 (emphasis added). Arguably
this response provides a second standard for employers to follow when making a
prediction. The simple avoidance of "conscious overstatement" test is certainly more
lenient than the rigorous "objective fact" guidelines set forth earlier in the opinion.
It is likely that an employer could avoid "conscious overstatement," "brinkmanship,"
and in general be in good faith, but commit an unfair labor practice by making a
prediction not founded on economic necessity and objective fact. Thus, the Chief
Justice responded inadequately to Sinclair's claim of vagueness and added more con-
fusion to the anomalous prediction standard by creating a second standard.
43 Christensen and Chrsitensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt": The
Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 411,
421 (1969-70).
44 Caesar's famous response to Brutus after being stabbed by him, "Et tu Brute,"
is imbued upon us at an early age. The traditional interpretation of this statement has
been "You, too, Brutus my son." However, some scholars have recently argued that
Caesar was actually saying "Brutus you son of a bitch." T. WHIrE, CAESAR AT TE
RuBicoN 169 (1968).
45 The first amendment is applicable to the states through the due process
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THE LENKURT HOLDING
The disputed speech in Lenkurt related to statements in the
form of predictions made by Linka during the two weeks immedi-
ately preceding the union election. Linka held meetings with groups
of three or four employees in order to express his views on the
ramifications of unionization.4" If the union won, Linka predicted,
the employees' coffee breaks and lunch hours would be strictly
regulated, sick leave benefits would be curtailed, and certain mis-
cellaneous services such as free laundry would have to be elimi-
nated.4 7 He further revealed to two employees the possibility that
they might have to be laid off.4" Finally, he told one employee, ap-
proaching retirement, that her pension would be jeopardized if the
union won.4 9 The disputed predictions were based primarily on the
belief that the Pressmen's Union, like other unions at Lenkurt,
would impose certain demands which the company would be forced
to grant.50
Judge Taylor speaking for the majority,5' interpreted Gissel
as establishing two standards by which an employer's communica-
tions may be judged objectionable:52 on matters within the employ-
er's control, he may not threaten his employees; on matters
clause of the fourteenth amendment which states "[n]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " See generally
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). It would be ludicrous to believe that either
the first or fourteenth amendments discriminate among persons afforded freedom of
speech. See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), wherein the Court stated,
"Like the school teacher in Slochower v. Board of Education [350 U.S. 551 (1956)],
and the policemen in Garrity v. New Jersey [385 U.S. 493 (1967)], lawyers also
enjoy first-class citizenship." Id. at 516. But cf. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)
(a foreign born naturalized citizen is "not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence
citizen." Id. at 827); and Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 174-84 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (interpreting the
majority's opinion as standing for the proposition that lawyers do not "enjoy the
full measure of constitutional rights accorded other citizens." Id. at 184).
46 The term employer is broad enough to include all levels of managerial personnel.
Linka's conduct was therefore imputed to the company. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(1970), defining "supervisor."
47 438 F.2d at 1106. For a thorough analysis of the facts, see the relevant portions
of the trial examiner's decision noted at 169 N.L.R.B. 958.
48 438 F.2d at 1107.
49 Id. at 1114-15 (dissenting opinion). The employee was about 57 years old.
Benefits under the Lenkurt pension plan were scheduled to begin at 62. Linka explained
to this employee that if the union won and "if things were slow at Lenkurt for any
period of time and she would go out to another job and we wanted to bring her back
and we found somebody else out of the [union] that would probably do her job a
little better, she would foreit (sic) her pension if there wasn't a spot with Lenkurt."
Id. at 1114 (dissenting opinion).
50 Id. at 1108.
51 Judge Taylor is the Chief Judge of the Federal District Court of Idaho. He
was sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and wrote the
majority (2-1) opinion in the instant case. Judge Browning wrote a vigorous dissenting
opinion strictly adhering to the Gissel standard.
52 438 F.2d at 1106.
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concerning action outside the employer's control, he may not fabri-
cate unlikely consequences.s Since Linka's predictions were based
on matters outside the employer's controls-the imposition of de-
mands by the union-the court concluded that there was a sufficient
factual basis for such speech." Therefore, the court held that such
expression was constitutionally protected under 8(c) and not an
unfair labor practice.55
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LENKURT AND GIsSEL
A superficial reading of the court's analysis in Lenkurt will
reveal few patently discernible differences between Gissel and Len-
kurt. The Lenkurt court, in a carefully reasoned opinion, presup-
posed both the validity of the Gissel standard and its application to
the instant fact situation.56 However, it would appear that a strict
application of the Gissel rule to the factual situation in the present
case should have led to the conclusion that Lenkurt committed an
unfair labor practice. Several glaring inconsistencies emerge which
reveal a deviation from the Gissel standard.
Relaxation of the "Objective Fact" Test
In Gissel, an employer's predictions were said to constitute an
unfair labor practice if they were not "carefully phrased on the
basis of objective fact.' 57 The Gissel Court determined that the
company's sincere belief that unionization might result in a plant
closure was not supported by objective fact .5  Nor did the company
have support for its prediction that the union "would have to strike
to be heard" or that the union was responsible for other plant
closures in the area. 9 The Lenkurt opinion, on the other hand,
reasoned that all of the disputed communications were rooted in
objective fact.3 Implicit in the court's analysis was an underlying
dissatisfaction with the rigid level of proof mandated by Gissel.
53 Id. "Thus an employer may not impliedly threaten retaliatory consequences
within his control, nor may he, in excess of imagination and under the guise of predic-
tion, fabricate hobgoblin consequences outside his control which have no basis in
objective fact."
54 Id. at 1107. "We find, contrary to the Board, nothing in these expressions by
the Company's supervisor to constitute either an express or implied threat of retaliatory
action by the Company."
55 Id. at 1108.
56 The Gissel standard is incorporated into Lenkurt at 438 F.2d at 1105-06.
57 395 U.S. at 618.
58 Id. at 618-19. "Conveyance of the employer's belief, even though sincere, that
unionization will or may result in the closing of the plant is not a statement of fact
unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of closing is capable of proof."
59 Id. at 619.
60 438 F.2d at 1108.
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While there may have been quantitatively more substantive
information available to the employer in Lenkurt than in Gissel
relating to the union's prospective demands, the Lenkurt opinion
failed to address itself to this sort of comparison. It may have done
this for two differing fundamental reasons: One, the court may
have reasoned that it was impossible, short of actual proof, for
anyone to achieve the level of objectivity required by the Gissel
standard with respect to predictions made beyond the employer's
control; Secondly, Linka admitted his predictions were based on
personal observations and other experiences with unions, not on a
sample union contract circulated to the employees prior to the
election which directly contradicted part of Linka's predictions con-
cerning union policy. The objective standard set forth in Gissel does
not embrace considerations of an employer's subjective observations.
Rather the court in Gissel would have compared Linka's predictions
of prospective union policy with those actually expressed by the
union in the sample contract and presumably would have reached
the same result as the dissent in Lenkurt.61
Instead of rigidly adhering to the Gissel precedent, the Lenkurt
court makes no attempt to analyze the veracity of the alleged illegal
speech. Rather, the court establishes its own standard for determin-
ing the requisite level of objectivity which validates an employer's
speech. The court promulgates a flexible two-part test requiring (1)
a close analysis of the circumstances surrounding his speech, and
(2) a determination that the results might have been anticipated
under such circumstances.2
Surrounding Circumstances. The opinion in Lenkurt reflects an
exhaustive, almost repetitive analysis of the prevailing atmosphere
at Lenkurt63 The court underscores the fact that the evidence re-
veals no background of union animosity by either the company"
or Linka personally. 5 Judge Taylor focuses on the Virginia Electric
61 The dissent in Lenkurt rests a good part of its case on the fact that there
were several major discrepancies between the sample union contract and the predictions
made by Linka.
The Company asserts that the underlying factual basis of these predictions
was that the Pressmen's Union, involved here, would negotiate a contract
changing the basis of pay from monthly salary to an hourly scale ....
As the Board points out, the sample contract that the Pressmen's Union
circulated did not provide an hourly scale but a weekly salary . . . . Id. at
1113 (dissenting opinion).
62 Id. "The predictions advanced by Linka were, under all the circumstances,
demonstrably probable consequences which might be anticipated as the result of
unionization."
63 Id. at 1107-08.
64 "[Njothing whatever in the record to indicate that the Company was adamantly
opposed to the . . . Union." Id. at 1107.
65 "The record clearly shows that Linka had been on friendly terms with the
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doctrine in support of this approach. 6  Under the rule of this early
United States Supreme Court decision, communications by an em-
ployer are viewed in light of the totality of employer conduct.6 7 In
Virginia Electric, the Court authorizes employers to express opinions
on "labor policies or problems" as long as they are not in effect
coercive.6 Thus, a detailed analysis of the surrounding circum-
stances is necessary in order to give the trier of fact a proper per-
spective by which to evaluate the speech. The Lenkurt majority, by
making such an analysis, was unwilling to judge an employer's speech
by the mechanical Gissel formula.
It seems appropriate to adopt by analogy Professor Paul
Freund's 9 critique of Justice Holmes' famous "clear and present
danger" test. Holmes posited that speech is constitutionally protected
unless "intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that will
bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United
States constitutionally may seek to prevent."7 Freund, however, is
opposed to such a simplified test. He hypothesizes that such stan-
dards as these "It]end to convey a delusion of certitude when what
is certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms
which the judge must disentangle."'" As Freund points out, there
can be no substitute for a "weighing of values. ' 2 Judge Taylor's
opinion in Lenkurt similarly evidences disdain for the simplistic
standard regulating speech set forth in Gissel. His preference for
a broad application of the Virginia Electric doctrine, with a view
towards all the circumstances, offers a refreshing revival and in-
terpretation of this older Supreme Court decision.
employees in the printing department, had been a union member in the past, and had
known most of the employees in the printing department for some years." Id.
66 Id. The Virginia Electric doctrine was derived from the landmark Supreme
Court case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
67 314 U.S. at 477.
68 Id. Accord, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944). The Supreme Court
reversed the Supreme Court of Texas' denial of the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus.
A Texas statute forbade solicitation of union membership prior to obtaining an
organizer's card. The petitioner addressed certain employees without obtaining said
card, in violation of a restraining order, and was therefore arrested for contempt.
The Court found the statute unconstitutional as it imposed prior restraint on a union
organizer's first amendment right of free speech. A union organizer's right of speech,
just as an employer's right of speech, is within the first amendment's guaranty. The
Court then advanced the following rule:
When to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion,
or give it that character, the limit of the right has been passed. [Citation
omitted]. But short oj that limit the employer's freedom cannot be impaired.
Id. at 537-38 (emphasis added).
69 p. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 24-28 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Freund].
70 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71 Freund at 27-28.
72 Id. at 27.
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Anticipated Results. The second part of the Lenkurt standard
is a novel approach to determine whether speech is protected. This
aspect of the standard requires a detailed examination of the em-
ployer's predictions to determine if they may be reasonably antici-
pated under the circumstances.73 This is certainly consistent with
the majority's emphasis on the totality of employer conduct. It was
held to be sufficient that the predictions in Lenkurt were predicated
on ((prior union contracts with other unions in the plant" as well as
Linka's "own experience and observations of the results of union
organization. 74 In essence, Linka's palaverous predictions were at
most "of possible disadvantages which might arise from economic
necessity or because of union policies. 75 Since such expression con-
tained "no threat of reprisal or force, or promise of benefit,17 it
was constitutionally protected by the first amendment.
The Economic Necessity of the Results
Clearly the outcome in Lenkurt was not reached because the
predictions were of demonstrably probable economic consequences.
This is contrary to Gissel's holding that even if "carefully phrased"
and based on "objective fact," a prediction of unfavorable conse-
quences must be founded on economic necessity.77 Judge Browning's
dissent in Lenkurt dutifully declaims that "there is little anywhere
in the record to demonstrate that the Printing Union's as yet un-
announced demands would substantially enhance the company's
costs." 78 The dissent also protests that while all of Linka's predicted
consequences were cast with great "precision and specificity," the
reasons behind such predictions were "identified only vaguely and
in most general terms.179 Assuming arguendo that the company
could have shown that unionization would lead to higher costs, there
is scant proof offered by Lenkurt that the prospective expenses could
not have been absorbed without cost cut-backs.80 In Gissel, where
the company was actually on "thin ice" financially, the Supreme
Court rejected Sinclair's claim of economic necessity."1 In fact, the
73 438 F.2d at 1108.
74 Id.
75 Id. See also the trial examiner's opinion, 169 N.L.R.B. at 958, which states:
"[it is not an unfair labor practice to dislike or oppose a union or to state one's
reasons for feeling so. . . .The display of anti-union hostility, without more, during
the course of an organizational campaign, is to be expected and not regarded as an
unfair labor practice."
76 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
77 395 U.S. at 618. See note 35, supra.
78 438 F.2d at 1114 (dissenting opinion).
79 Id. Judge Browning was referring to Linka's specific predictions such as
shorter coffee breaks and strict regulation of lunch half hours.
80 Id. Judge Browning also noted "There were no facts bearing upon the 'com-
petitive' conditions that the company was required to meet."
81 395 U.S. at 619.
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Lenkurt court makes no effort to determine whether the speech was
cast as a prediction or as an opinion.82 By adopting another pre-
Gissel case, P. R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB,"5 the court implicitly
finds such distinction to be unsound. Under the Mallory rule, an
employer's speech, whether it be an opinion or a prediction, is to be
judged by 8(c).8 As long as such communication is not a "direct
or subtle threat of employer reprisal," such speech is protected by
8(c). 8 5
Adoption of Defamation Standards
The court of appeals in Lenkurt adds a significant new di-
mension to analysis of speech during a union organizational cam-
paign by prescribing: "The Supreme Court and this circuit are
committed to the principle that debate in union campaigns should
be vigorous and uninhibited, subject to the limitations . . . hereto-
fore set forth."' In support of this proposition, the court cites Linn
v. Plant Guard Workers,8 7 not Gissel, as the prime determinant of
the precise limitations on an employer's speech. Linn involved al-
legedly defamatory speech made during a union organizational cam-
paign. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Clark held that the National Labor
Relations Act does not preclude an employer from instituting a
defamation action against a union for allegedly libelous speech
uttered during an organizational campaign.88
82 438 F.2d at 1108, n.4, quoting P. R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 704,
707, n.2 (7th Cir. 1967). But see 395 U.S. at 618 "[A]n employer," according to
Chief Justice Warren, "is free to communicate ...his general views about unionism
or any of his specific views about a particular union" so long as they fall within
8(c) limitations. However, the Chief Justice qualifies the above standard by requiring
that predictions be "carefully phrased," founded on "objective fact," demonstrate
"probable consequences beyond . . . [the employer's] . .. control," and relate to
"economic necessities."
83 389 F.2d 704. Judge Swygert, speaking for a unanimous court, overturned the
Board's order as to the employer's communications, holding such speech (contained
in four letters) protected by 8(c). "The company had a right to state its opinion
about the potential effects upon its customers if costs were increased as a result of
granting union demands ... thus compelling higher prices for its product. Similarly,
the company had a right to speculate about the consequences of a strike called if the
company refused to meet union demands." Id. at 707.
84 Id. at 707. "[I]f a statement cannot be interpreted as a subtle suggestion that
the employer will seek to thwart unionization by visiting economic disadvantage upon
his employees, but rather that such consequences may result from unionization itself,
the statement is immune ....
85 Id.
86 438 F.2d at 1108 (emphasis added).
87 383 U.S. 53 (1966). Also cited is NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967).
88 Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). Justice Clark speaking
for the majority upheld an employer's complaint for damages arising out of an
allegedly libelous publication by a union during an organizational campaign. In
Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion, with whom Chief Justice Warren, and Justice
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The standard applied in Linn respecting speech was originally
set forth in N.Y. Times v. Sullivan."9 In essence, this standard states
that a cause of action for defamation will lie if speech is published
with knowledge that it is false or with a reckless disregard of the
truth. However, by way of dictum, Justice Clark addressed himself
to certain provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. With
respect to 8 (c) he cautioned that it "manifests a congressional intent
to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and manage-
ment""° and instructed the Board neither to "police" nor "censor"
election propaganda."' On the other hand, the United States Supreme
Court in Gissel refused to apply the N.Y. Times standard.92 The
express reasoning for such refusal was based on Warren's deter-
mination to distinguish union elections from political elections.
3
Douglas joined, the primary question was with the Court's jurisdiction. In essence,
they felt the Court should not have permitted the libel suit at all. Justice Fortas
stated:
Congress has in unmistakable terms recognized the importance of labor-
management dialogue untrammelled by fear of retribution for strong utter-
ances. It has manifested awareness that lusty speech provides a useful safety
valve for the tensions which often accompany these controversies. Id. at 73
(dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
Justice Black in a separate dissenting opinion decreed that any attempt "to try to
purify the language of labor disputes (where] both sides are masters of the arts of
vilification, invective and exaggeration" is a herculean task that should be avoided.
Id. at 67-68.
Note that Justice Black was part of the unanimous Gissel opinion. Yet he filed
a vigorous dissent in Linn which appears to be more consonant with his long standing
approach towards freedom of speech. In 1969, Justice Black wrote:
My view is without deviation, without exception, without any ifs, buts, or
whereases, that freedom of speech means that the government shall not do
anything to people, or in the words of the Magna Charta, move against the
people, either for the views they have or the views they express or the words
they speak or write . .. .As I have said innumerable times before I simply
believe that "Congress shall make no law" means Congress shall make no law.
H. BL.cA , A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1969) noted in 5 VAL. L. REv. 178, 183
(1970).
89 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90 Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966). "And as we stated in
another context, cases involving speech are to be considered 'against the background
of a profound . . . commitment to the principle that debate .. .should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks.' The Court was quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
91 383 U.S. at 60.
92 "A vote on union recognition is not comparable to 'the election of legislators
or the enactment of legislation .... '" 438 F.2d at 1111 (dissenting opinion), citing
395 U.S. at 617-18.
93 395 U.S. at 617-18. "[Wlhat is basically at stake is the establishment of a
nonpermanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically dependent
employee and his union agent, not the election of legislators or the enactment of
legislation whereby the relationship is ultimately defined and where the independent
voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a class freer to talk."
Compare the statement of Dean Bok in The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
38, 69 (1964-65):
[Wihen the employer merely seeks to engender emotions and prejudices that
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However, the effect of the refusal to apply the N.Y. Times standard
in Gissel, combined with the conspicuous absence of Justice Clark's
opinion in Linn, is strong evidence of the Gissel Court's desire to
establish separate criteria for evaluating speech which is allegedly
an unfair labor practice. Actually, the Ninth Circuit's adoption of
the Linn-N.Y. Times standard is the only explicit deviation from
the traditional Gissel analysis.
Respect of the Board's Order
Judge Browning's dissenting opinion in Lenkurt relies heavily
on the rule of Universal Camera v. NLRB.91 This decision in-
terpreted section 10(e) 95 of the Act as requiring the courts to accept
the Board's findings as conclusive as long as its decision is supported
by "substantial evidence."9 Because of the Board's special com-
petence, Judge Browning felt compelled to reach the same result
as the Board, even though the court might have reached a different
result had the case been before it de novo.97 The Gissel Court applied
substantially the same reasoning, stating:
[T]he Board could reasonably conclude that the intended and under-
stood import of that message was not to predict that unionization would
inevitably cause the plant to close but to threaten to throw employees
out of work regardless of the economic realities.98
In the instant case, the Lenkurt majority in reversing the
Board's decision, does not give such total respect to the Board's
findings. One probable explanation of this is that when the trial
examiner and the Board reach different results, courts implicitly
do not depend upon his power over the employees, he does no more than anypolitical candidate might do in exploiting racial issues or predicting the dire
consequences which will follow if his opponent is elected. Such tactics may
appeal to passion rather than reason, but it would be just as improper forthe Government to draw this line in representation elections as it would bein the ordinary run of political campaigns.
94 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
95 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(e), 29 U.S.C.§ 160(e) (1970). Section 10(e) gives the Board the power to petition the respective
courts of appeals to enforce their orders. The court may then enforce, modify, or totally
set aside the Board's order in whole or in part. However, "The findings of the Board
with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole shall be conclusive."96 340 U.S. at 488-90. See generally, Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence
on the Whole Record," 64 HARv. L. Rzv. 1233 (1951).
97 438 F.2d at 1109 (dissenting opinion).
98 395 U.S. at 619. The Supreme Court recognized in Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 534 (1944), that
General words create different and often particular impressions on different
minds. No speaker, however careful, can convey exactly his meaning, or the
same meaning, to the different members of his audience.Query: If the above proposition is true, couldn't the Board almost always reasonably
conclude that the understood import of an employer's speech was a threat?
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tend to review the decision with greater care." Thus, the court of
appeals in Lenkurt was able to dispose of the strong presumption
that favors the Board's holding in order to give its interpretation of
the precise scope and meaning of the first amendment in the context
of a union organizational campaign. It is quite possible that had the
trial examiner and the Board arrived at the same conclusion, the
Lenkurt majority would have yielded to that decision.
Therefore, it is likely that Lenkurt will be applied quite re-
strictively in the Ninth Circuit. As long as the two administrative
bodies below are in accord, the judiciary may refrain from applying
the Lenkurt standard. In fact, to this date, Lenkurt has indeed been
absent from other Ninth Circuit opinions.100 For example, in a recent
per curiam decision, NLRB v. Raytheon Co., the court reluctantly
upheld the Board's finding that the company's speech constituted an
unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 101
While admitting that it had some difficulty with the inferences
drawn by both the trial examiner and the Board, the court recog-
nized the "Board's expertise and special competence" and could not
find that its conclusion was wrong.
1 2
Difference in Tone
In Gissel, the Court forewarned employers that they must be
"careful in waging their anti-union campaign." 0 3 Chief Justice
Warren postulated that communications containing any implication
of employer retaliation are beyond first amendment protection.0 4
It is all too obvious that the Chief Justice was endeavoring to search
for such hidden implications.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's disposition in Lenkurt
reflects a complete change in tone from the suspecting view the Gissel
Court took toward employer predictions. The philosophy of the
Lenkurt court appears to be an undeviating policy that an employer's
99 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The Supreme Court
implicitly ordered the court of appeals to review Board decisions more carefully when
they conflict with the trial examiners' order.
[Elvidence supporting [the Board's] conclusion may be less substantial when
an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived
with the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he
has reached the same conclusion. Id. at 496.
The Lenkurt majority fails to cite this aspect of the Universal Camera rule. Instead,
the court cites several minor circuit court cases inferentially making the same proposi-
tion.
100 As of January 1, 1972.
101 445 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1971) (the opinion included the support of Judge
Browning).
102 Id. at 274.
103 395 U.S. at 616.
104 Id. at 618.
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speech falls within first amendment protections. The tempo of the
Lenkurt opinion is best exemplified by Judge Taylor's insistence
that employees must have the opportunity to "hear all sides of the
question in order that they may exercise the informed and reasoned
choice that is their right."'105 Thus, the court subtly reprimands the
Board for giving a "narrow construction" and "strained interpreta-
tion" to employer speech. 06
CONCLUSION
Whether the court of appeal's decision in NLRB v. Lenkurt
Electric07 will be recognized as useful precedent by other courts
both in and out of the Ninth Circuit is not yet clear. Rather than
arriving at a panacean solution for this elusive area of the law, the
present analysis merely recognizes the subtle distinctions between
the Lenkurt and Gissel opinions. For example, it is clear that Lenkurt
is more consonant with the holding and policy of Virginia Electric
and Linn than it is with Gissel. The court impels the Board to look
at all the circumstances when evaluating an employer's speech. There
is also a re-emphasis, if not restoration, of the notion that employers
are free to take any side they choose during a union organizational
campaign.' Furthermore, the Lenkurt majority warns the Board
not to give narrow interpretations to employer speech. 109 The Len-
kurt opinion is also more consistent with the express meaning of
8(c)" 0 and the first amendment, neither of which delimits special
standards governing predictions.
There seems to be no logical rationale for a perpetuation of the
Gissel standard which has a "chilling effect" on an employer's free-
dom of speech. Even if it is necessary to distinguish between predic-
tions and other types of speech, such distinction may be accomplished
by scrutinizing predictions in light of the surrounding circumstances
to determine whether such speech is in fact threatening or coercive,
therefore exceeding the bounds of the first amendment. To ameliorate
the current unfairness, Lenkurt's expansive interpretation and ap-
plication of the first amendment offers a legitimate new approach
to an enigmatic area of the law.
The ideal method of resolving the inherent conflict between
Gissel and Lenkurt is for the Supreme Court to set forth a new ju-
105 438 F.2d at 1108.
10 Id.
107 Id. at 1102.
108 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
109 438 F.2d at 1108.
110 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
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dicial decree. Hopefully Lenkurt will serve as a focal point around
which the Court could fashion its new standards. Since the Court
has not come down with a major decision regarding an employer's
freedom of speech during a union organizational campaign since
1969, and arguably a conflicting case has arisen,"' it now seems
appropriate to reconsider the Gissel standard. If nothing else, the
instant case should at least serve as useful precedent for the Board
and Ninth Circuit when evaluating whether or not an employer's
speech is constitutionally protected.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court continues to avoid
this topic, Congress may very well feel compelled to amend section
8(c) to specifically include the word "predictions." Congress might
also add an explicit sentence to 8 (c) giving employers the same first
amendment protections as unions, employees, or for that matter
every other citizen of the United States. The only constitutionally
permissible limitations on an employer's speech during a union orga-
nizational campaign are those expressly stated in section 8 (c).
Rather than interpreting Lenkurt as being pro-employer or
Ill While Lenkurt may be the most obvious example of judicial dissatisfaction
with the Gissel standard, there are rumblings of dissent in other circuits as well.
NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2nd Cir. 1971). Although the court
upheld the Board's decision that the company committed an unfair labor practice, it
entertained serious doubts whether the Gissel test should apply in all its severity.
We do not see, for example, how it could be held consistently with § 8(c),
that an employer may not tell employees that if a union presses demands for
greater benefits, typically higher wages, as it presumably will have to do in
order to justify the collection of dues, he will endeavor to compensate for
any extra expense of that nature by negotiating for the elimination of benefits
the employees have enjoyed in the past, less directly measureable in dollars
but contributing to costs, such as providing loans or free coffee breaks, and
retention of employees during slow periods-and this even though the employer
might be able both to pay higher wages and continue the benefits if he were
able to raise his prices or content to reduce his profits. If that be so, it would
defy reality to insist that a man in overalls, working on the plant floor,
[referring to the supervisor who uttered the disputed speech] should precisely
adhere to the niceties of expression that would be used by a careful lawyer
trained in labor relations law. Id. at 900 (emphasis added).
Boaz Spinning Co. Inc., v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1971). The court, in
overruling the Board's decision, stated that the "[r]ight of free speech in a union
organizational campaign is not to be narrowly restricted... . Nor is the right of free
speech to be unequally applied as between employers and labor unions. There is no
basis for adopting a narrow restrictive rule for one party and a liberal one for the
other." Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1971). This case recognized that
the interests of employees and unions are not necessarily parallel and that the "modern
working man is too sophisticated to be influenced by such campaign promises ...
Id. at 364.
McGraw-Edison Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1969). Judge Blackmun
(now Justice Blackmun) upheld the Board's order but agreed with the employer's
contention that it is the nature of campaign propaganda to induce fear and this alone
will not deprive it of protection of § 8(c). Id. at 70. See also Arbie Mineral Feed Co.
v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1971); H. L. Meyer Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d
1090 (8th Cir. 1970).
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anti-union, it should be considered to be pro-employee and consistent
with the intent of Congress when passing 8 (c).112 An employee must
be able to hear all sides of the issue in order to exercise his right to
cast a free and unfettered vote. As Justice Clark aptly states in Linn:
It is clear that the Board does not "police or censor propaganda used in
the election it conducts, but rather leaves to the good sense of the
voters the appraisal of such matters, and to opposing parties the task
of correcting inaccurate and untruthful statements." 11
While the necessity for limiting an employer's speech during a
union organizational campaign may have been justifiable to effectu-
ate the policy of the National Labor Relations Act in the past, a long
line of judicial 4 and Board" 5 decisions expanding a union's right
to organize on company premises combined with the spectacular
growth of organized labor over the past thirty years"" has clearly
eliminated the need to over-compensate the unions for previous dis-
112 H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947): "Both the House bill
and the Senate [version of § 8(c)] contained provisions designed to protect the right
of both employers and labor organizations to free speech." See also S. REP. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947). The Senate, in its discussion of § 8(c), took cog-
nizance of the Supreme Court's statement in Thomas v. Collins that the "Constitution
guarantees freedom of speech on either side in labor controversies . ..." The sameprinciple was more broadly articulated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 438 (1963).
"For the Constitution protects expression and association without regard to race,
creed, or political or religious affiliation of the members of the group which invokesits shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which
are offered." Id. at 445.118 383 U.S. at 60, citing Stewart-Warner Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1158 (1953).
114 For example, see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), which
affirmed in principle the rule of Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966),
requiring employers to give unions within a specified period a list of names and
addresses of the employees. It is interesting to note that the Board analogized union
elections with political elections which the Supreme Court expressly refused to do in
Gissel in 1968 and implicitly accepted in Wyman-Gordon one year later.
115 For example, see Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962), forbidding an
employer from engendering racial prejudices. Cf. The Archer Laundry, 150 N.L.R.B.1427 (1965), permitting a union to use racial propaganda because its purpose was not
to inflame the hatred of Blacks towards Caucasians, rather to instill sense of "racial
self-consciousness." See also Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962), over-
turning a broad no-distribution-of-literature rule because it unnecessarily extended to
non-working areas; Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953), neither an em-ployer nor a union may give a speech on company time to massed audiences within 24
hours of the election; and General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948) requiring that
there be "laboratory conditions" during the election period.
116 NATIONAL UNION MEMBERSHIP: 1940-1968
1940 1950 1955 1960 1965 1968Membershipa (in 1000's) ...... 8,944 15,000 17,749 18,117 18,469 20,210
Percentage of total labor forceb 15.5 22.0 24.4 23.3 22.4 23.0
a Includes Canadian members of labor unions with headquarters in the U.S.
b Percentages calculated on union membership excluding Canadian membership.
Source: DEPARTMENT OP LABOR, BUREAU OF STATISTIcS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATIsTIcs, DnicTORy OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNIoNs IN
TnE UNITED STATEs, compiled from the 1966 LABOR RELATIONs YEARBOOK at
497 and the 1970 LABOR RELATIoNs YEARBOOK at 501.
DUE PROCESS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
advantages. Indeed, it is questionable whether the logic behind such
restraints on speech were justified in the first place. It is at least
arguable that a large number of employees do not even consider
employer or union propaganda at all. Rather, their decisions will be
made as a result of societal, political, familial, and other variables
having little or nothing to do with the proposals and promises of
either the company or the union.
We have long since passed the day when any citizen's first
amendment rights should be abridged without strong evidence of
a compelling state interest. Freedom of speech needs breathing space
to survive." ' It is far too precious a fundamental right to restrict-
especially during a political or union election.
Andrew H. Swartz
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUE PROCESS FOR PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEES-Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489
P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971).*
INTRODUCTION
May a local government employee, in the absence of a statutory
merit system adopted for his protection,' be dismissed without cause,
without notice or hearing, and without opportunity for judicial re-
view? The California Supreme Court has, with certain qualifications,
answered this question in the affirmative in its recent decision in
Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors.'
117 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). "Just as erroneous statements must be
protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so
statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly
protected." Id. at 136.
* This note should be read in light of the recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 40 U.S.L.W. 5079 (U.S. June 29, 1972)
(No. 71-162) and Perry v. Sindermann, 40 U.S.L.W. 5087 (U.S. June 29, 1972)
(No. 70-36), which are discussed in the addendum. These decisions were handed
down while this note was in the printing stages and therefore are not included in
the main body of the discussion.
1 A civil service or merit system may be defined as a statutory scheme which
encompasses various rules concerning the acquisition and retention of public employ-
ment. Such a system typically provides that promotions be based on merit and
dismissals be supported by good cause. It may also provide for a hearing to determine
the existence of such good cause. When a statute adopting a civil service or merit
system provides for dismissal only for cause, the California courts have, out of con-
siderations of common justice and fairness, found a hearing required by implication,
Steen v. Board of Civil Serv. Comm'rs, 26 Cal. 2d 716, 160 P.2d 816 (1945) ; but if
the ordinance provides for dismissal without a hearing, that provision would be
controlling, Doyle v. Miller, 114 Cal. App. 2d 347, 250 P.2d 324 (1952).
2 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971) (Wright, C.J., and
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Leonard J. Bogacki, a permanent public employee of a noncivil
service county,8 was dismissed from his position as building inspector
in the county department of building and safety on grounds of in-
subordination and misconduct.4 Under the terms of the ordinances
and resolutions governing county employment, employees served at
the pleasure of their department heads subject to certain limited
appeal rights.5 A county resolution provided for a hearing by a
review board empowered to determine if reasonable cause existed
for an employee dismissal and to recommend eligibility of the em-
ployee for future employment in the absence of such reasonable
cause. The resolution also provided that the action and decision of
the review board was to be final and not subject to judicial review.6
Bogacki appealed his dismissal to the review board. The board
vindicated him of all charges of insubordination, misconduct or in-
competency, finding no factual support whatever for his dismissal.
Bogacki then petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Board
of Supervisors to set aside his wrongful dismissal, reinstate him to
his former position, and reimburse him for lost compensation. Bo-
gacki charged that his dismissal was motivated by his activities in
a professional organization for building inspectors and therefore was
in violation of his right to free speech and assembly. He also main-
tained that the dismissal was arbitrary and capricious and deprived
him of property without due process of law by taking his position
from him and placing a stigma upon his professional competency.
Bogacki insisted that his placement on an eligibility list afforded
him no relief since he was unqualified for positions in county em-
ployment other than in his former department and that he had not
been offered employment since the decision of the review board."
The trial court denied Bogacki's petition for writ of mandate
McComb, Mosk, and Burke, J.J., concurring in the opinion of Sullivan, J., with
Peters, J., concurring in the dissenting opinion of Tobriner, J.), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1972) (No. 5956). Some idea of the possible impact
of this decision may be garnered from statistical figures gathered in 1965. In thatyear, there were approximately 2,028,000 state and 5,973,000 local public employees.Estimates indicated that 35% of the full-time state employees were not under any
type of civil service system, and of the nation's 3,050 counties, approximately 2,850
of them did not have a civil service law. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7.
3 Counties are not required to adopt a merit system for their public employees;however, they may do so under the provisions of the County Civil Service Enabling
Law, CAL Gov'T CoDE § 31100 et seq. (West 1968).
4 Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 774, 489 P.2d 537, 538, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 657, 658 (1971).
5 "Every officer shall appoint all necessary employees allowed or provided for his
department by this ordinance and may demote or remove any employee of thedepartment without notice and for cause satisfactory to himself, subject only to the
provisions of this ordinance and requirements of law." Id. at 775, 489 P.2d at 539,
97 Cal. Rptr. at 659 (court's emphasis).
6 Id. at 775-76 n.2, 489 P.2d at 539-40 n.2, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 659-60 n.2.
7 Id. at 774-78, 489 P.2d at 538-41, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 658-61.
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on the grounds that he had not sustained the burden of showing that
his dismissal was triggered by his engagement in constitutionally
protected activities. The California Supreme Court, despite a finding
that the record failed to disclose any specific reason for his dismissal
and that the evidence showed him to have performed his work com-
petently at all times, affirmed the decision. It was stated that the
courts would intervene only if Bogacki could show that he was dis-
missed as a result of the exercise of specific constitutional rights,
and that the record supported by substantial evidence the trial court's
finding that he had not sustained that burden.'
The California Supreme Court rejected Bogacki's contention
that the review board was impliedly vested by county law with the
power to reinstate an employee upon a finding that there was no
reasonable cause for dismissal. The court then went on to address
Bogacki's principal constitutional argument that,
an absolute power of dismissal pertaining to public employees is for-
bidden by due process insofar as it permits a dismissal that is "arbitrary
and capricious and without just cause"; that a dismissal pursuant to
such a power is "arbitrary and capricious and without just cause" unless
it is shown by substantial evidence that there was a valid reason for
dismissal; that the record in this case fails to show by substantial evi-
dence that there was a valid reason for petitioner's dismissal; that the
trial court's finding that petitioner's dismissal was not "arbitrary and
capricious and without just cause" was therefore unsupported; and that
the dismissal was therefore in violation of petitioner's constitutional
rights. 9
In rejecting this argument, the court stated as a well-settled propo-
sition that a public employee serving at the pleasure of the appoint-
ing authority may be terminated without cause and without notice
or hearing.' The court pointed out that this proposition was qualified
by the principle that public employment, even that of a probationary
employee, may not be conditioned upon a waiver of constitutional
rights" absent a showing of a compelling interest.'2 In the absence
of such a waiver of constitutional rights, however, a public employee
such as Bogacki is by the terms of his employment subject to re-
s Id. at 778, 489 P.2d at 541, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
9 Id. at 781, 489 P.2d at 544, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (court's emphasis).
10 Id. at 782, 489 P.2d at 544, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 664. The court cites Ball v. City
Council, 252 Cal. App. 2d 136, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967), and cases cited therein.
11 The court adopts the so-called doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"-that
even something like public employment which has often been regarded as a privilege
may not be conditioned by government upon the waiver of collateral constitutional
rights, such as the right of free speech, absent a showing of a paramount public interest.
See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HAiv. L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne];
Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961); Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
12 5 Cal. 3d at 782, 489 P.2d at 544, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (1971). The court
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moval without judicially cognizable good cause. In view of the broad
discretion reposing in governmental agencies and in consideration
of comity and administrative efficiency, the courts will refrain from
substituting their judgment for that of responsible officials.'" The
court emphasized that the power of removal given to a department
head was absolute within the terms of applicable county law. Ju-
dicially cognizable good cause, if it were required, would render
the power of the department head wholly chimerical and would pos-
sibly compel him to accept someone he personally felt to be incom-
petent.
It was the court's rejection of Bogacki's constitutional argu-
ment delineated above to which Mr. Justice Tobriner objected inhis scholarly and vehement dissent. According to Justice Tobriner,
"the majority's conclusion is . . . grounded on the premise that the
strictures of the 'due process' clause are not applicable in any man-
ner to the government's discharge of a permanent employee." 4 Jus-
tice Tobriner felt that the majority had ignored the statement once
made by former United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jack-
son that "[t]o stand between the individual and arbitrary action by
the government is the highest function of the court."' 5
After an examination and evaluation of the authorities relied
upon by the majority in arriving at its decision, this writer will
discuss the constitutional arguments propounded by Mr. Justice
Tobriner in urging that the court order Mr. Bogacki's reinstate-
ment to his former position. The principal issue to be addressed is
whether public employment can be considered a sufficient interest
to be brought within the protection afforded by the concepts of
substantive and procedural due process and the implications ofBogacki vis-a-vis the resolution of that issue. In addition, the dis-
cussion will focus on the extent to which judicial review of admin-
istrative discretion may be afforded without undue interference with
employment decisions.
THE COURT'S OPINION-LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
Substantive due process has been defined in terms of a standard
of reasonableness.' Government action which is not supported by
cites Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409,
55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).13 5 Cal. 3d at 783, 489 P.2d at 545, 97 Cal. Rptr. 665. The court cites Rosenfield
v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 562-63, 421 P.2d 697, 699, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505, 507 (1967).14 5 Cal. 3d at 808, 489 P.2d at 563, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (dissenting opinion)(court's emphasis).
15 Id. at 808, 489 P.2d at 563-64, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84, quoted in W. GELLHORN
& C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASE & COMMENT 814 (4th ed. 1960).1 16 Am. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law I 550 (1964).
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reason is arbitrary. When such arbitrary action infringes upon le-
gally protected interests, there is a denial of due process. Thus, due
process secures the citizen against any arbitrary deprivation of his
rights, whether relating to his life, his liberty, or his property."
The majority of the court in Bogacki effectively holds that the
protection afforded by the concept of substantive due process as
defined above is not applicable to a public employee's interest in
his government job in the absence of some protective statutory
scheme circumscribing employee dismissals. The court is supported
in this conclusion by a line of California cases concerning dismissals
of public employees not serving under the auspices of a civil service
or merit system.'8 The reasoning involved in these cases is exempli-
fied in Hackler v. Ward.'9 In that case, a police chief serving at the
pleasure of the city council contested his dismissal on grounds that
no good cause for the dismissal could be shown. In denying him
relief, the court emphasized that there was no vested right in his
public employment but, on the contrary, the right of the city council
to dismiss at its pleasure and without cause was a public right which
exists for a public purpose.1°
The majority also relies upon a more recent series of decisions
2 1
which have adopted the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions22
-
that distribution of government benefits or privileges may not be
conditioned upon the waiver of specific constitutional rights in the
absence of a compelling public interest. These cases have usually
involved claims by discharged employees that their dismissals were
motivated by their political or labor union activities.' The appli-
17 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889).
18 Humber v. Castro Valley County Fire Protection Dist., 214 Cal. App. 2d 1,
29 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1963); Cozzolino v. City of Fontana, 136 Cal. App. 2d 608, 289
P.2d 248 (1955); Hackler v. Ward, 105 Cal. App. 2d 615, 234 P.2d 170 (1951);
Chambers v. City of Sunnyvale, 56 Cal. App. 2d 438, 132 P.2d 849 (1942). See
CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 36506 (West 1968), providing that appointive officers and employees
of municipalities hold office during the pleasure of the city council.
19 105 Cal. App. 2d 615, 234 P.2d 170 (1951). See Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.
2d 140, 82 P.2d 434 (1938), where it was stated that there was no vested right in
public employment except insofar as conferred by statute or valid regulation, and
Ludolph v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 30 Cal. App. 2d 211, 86 P.2d 118 (1938),
where it was held that no question of due process was involved since there was no
vested right in public employment.
20 Hackler v. Ward, 105 Cal. App. 2d 615, 617, 234 P.2d 170, 171 (1951).
21 Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 421 P.2d 697, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967);
Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1966); Stanton v. Dumke, 64 Cal. 2d 199, 411 P.2d 108, 49 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1966); Ball v. City Council, 252 Cal. App. 2d 136, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967).
Accord, Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr.
409 (1967); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1967); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171
P.2d 885 (1946).
22 See note 11, supra.
23 See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 717 (1969).
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cation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to public employees
having a status similar to that of Mr. Bogacki was recognized in
Ball v. City Council24 where the court stated:
Recent decisions have discredited the notion that the power to dismiss
a public employee without cause includes the power to dismiss for any
cause. Thus, continuance in employment, even of one serving at the
pleasure of the appointing power, may not be conditioned upon the
employee's abstinence from exercising a constitutional right to engagein political activity not incompatible with the performance of his
duties.25
In conjunction with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
the majority implicitly recognizes a rather limited and undefined
procedural due process right to be heard on the question of whether
any unconstitutional conditions have been imposed. 2 The majority
appears to afford Mr. Bogacki such limited procedural due process
by reviewing the findings of the review board and the trial court.
The majority determines that the conclusion that Mr. Bogacki was
not dismissed because of the exercise of his first amendment rights
was supported by substantial evidence in the record.27 This right to
minimal procedural due process was recognized in Rosenfield v.
Malcolm2 s over objections that employees serving at the pleasure
of the appointing authority may be dismissed without notice or
hearing. The California Supreme Court in that case recognized that
the normal deference given to administrative decisions was not ap-
plicable where there was evidence in the record that unconstitutional
conditions have been imposed upon the retention of public employ-
ment.
29
Thus, it appears that there is a clear line of authority in Cali-
fornia rejecting substantive due process protection for public em-
ployees in Mr. Bogacki's position. This same authority circumscribes
the protection given such employees to that afforded by the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine. This doctrine as applied by the ma-jority in Bogacki does not protect a public employee from a dismissal
24 252 Cal. App. 2d 136, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967).
25 Id. at 141, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
26 Professor Van Alstyne points out that it is unclear to what extent the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions may give rise to procedural due process in order to
detect such unconstitutional conditions. It is uncertain whether procedural due process
will be imported in all cases of administrative decision or only where the decision restsprima facie upon some basis violative of an explicit collateral right. Van Alstyne,
supra note 11, at 1453.
27 A substantial evidence review is that review normally afforded by a judge
when reviewing a jury verdict on appeal-whether on the whole record rational men
could have reached the decision made. See, e.g., 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVW LAW TREATISE§ 29.02, at 118 (1958).
28 65 Cal. 2d 559, 421 P.2d 697, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967).
29 Id. at 563, 421 P.2d at 699, 55 Cal. Rptr. at gn7.
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without reason, but only from a dismissal which he can prove was
for a constitutionally impermissible reason.
THE DISSENT-DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Public Employment and Varying Standards
In promulgating his objections to the holding in Bogacki, Mr.
Justice Tobriner begins with the elementary proposition that the
due process clause is intended to protect the individual from arbi-
trary action and that action is arbitrary when it lacks support in
the evidence."0 Justice Tobriner states that the majority's failure to
apply this concept to public employment rests on adherence to a
line of cases which views public employment as a privilege which
may be granted or withheld by government on whatever terms it
desires." He goes on to say that, although the majority recognizes
the more recent line of cases discrediting the privilege doctrine, they
fail to recognize that this developing series of decisions also brings
into play substantive due process protection from arbitrary action.
Justice Tobriner relies on a line of decisions which he interprets
as prohibiting arbitrary dismissals from public employment in the
sense that the reasons for dismissal bear no reasonable relation to
the employee's fitness for the job. 2 The majority, he asserts, in-
correctly interprets these cases to hold that a dismissal cannot be
based upon a waiver of collateral constitutional guarantees such
as the privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Tobriner remon-
strates that those cases which are actually decided on the basis of
80 5 Cal. 3d at 787, 489 P.2d at 548, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (dissenting opinion).
Tobriner cites Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302
(1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399-400 (1923); ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913);
Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886);
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
31 Justice Holmes was a proponent of this doctrine epitomized in his now famous
epigram, "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,
155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
U.S. 442, 451 (1954); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59-60 (1950), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); 1 DAVIS, ADmiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 7.11, at 452-62 (1958).
32 5 Cal. 3d at 789 n.5, 489 P.2d at 549 n.5, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 669 n.5 (dissenting
opinion). Tobriner cites Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Wilson v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d
61, 351 P.2d 761, 4 Cal. Rptr. 489,.(1960).,See. Connellv. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971); Cramp v.,Boaid "of Public Instruction, i68 U.S. 278 (1961) ; Beilan v. Board
of Education, '357 U.S. 399 (1958); 'Hofblergv. Los Angeles Civil Serv. Comm'n,
258 Cal. App. 2d 433, 65 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1968).
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a waiver of constitutional rights require more than the mere ra-
tional relationship standard of substantive due process, but require
the more stringent standard of compelling public interest.3 He goes
on to say that this dual constitutional standard which is applicable
in the public employment cases is analogous to the two-level test
currently employed in reviewing legislative classifications under the
equal protection clause. 4
The foundation case which Justice Tobriner heralds as the ini-
tial application of the substantive due process standard to dismissals
and exclusions from public employment is Wieman v. Updegraff.85
In that case, a state statute requiring state employees to take a
loyalty oath disavowing past membership in subversive organizations
was declared unconstitutional. The statute was held to be unreason-
able and a denial of due process because it excluded persons from
state employment solely on the basis of membership without regard
to knowledge of subversive purposes or activities. In voiding the
statute, the Court in Wieman stressed the irrelevance of the privilege
doctrine:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public em-ployment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does
extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.6
Numerous cases have followed the rationale of the Wieman
case.17 In Slochower v. Board of Education,"8 a provision of the city
charter which terminated a teacher's employment automatically upon
83 Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 421 P.2d409, 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1966): A government agency requiring waiver of
constitutional rights as a condition of employment must show (1) that political re-
straints rationally relate to the enhancement of the public service, (2) that the benefit
which the public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of constitu-
tional rights, and (3) that no alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights are
available. Accord, Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 337, 392 P.2d 385,
388, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 628 (1964).
84 Professor Van Alstyne analyzes Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952),
as an equal protection case due to its choice of words which tend to describe an invalid
scheme of legislative classification. He expresses the belief that "[a] systematic review
of the equal protection and due process lines of cases would . . . readily establish thatthe constitutional tests of 'arbitrary classification' are rapidly becoming indistinguishablefrom the constitutional tests of 'unreasonable regulation' under the due process clause."
Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 1456.
35 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The concurring opinion of Justice Black was based onfirst amendment grounds-that government should not be able to penalize speech andthought as opposed to acts. Id. at 193. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion
argued that the law was invalid because it interfered with the right of free association
which is especially important where teachers are involved. Id. at 195.38 Id. at 192. See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 305 F. Supp. 445, 451-53 (1969),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
8 Cases cited note 32, supra.
38 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination was invalidated.
The Court reasoned that the invocation of the privilege was not a
proper measure of the employee's qualifications and was therefore
an arbitrary dismissal in violation of due process.
9 The California
courts, using similar reasoning, invalidated exclusions from eligibil-
ity for local civil service positions in Wilson v. City of Los Angeles
40
and Hofberg v. Los Angeles Civil Service Commission.41 In Wilson,
where the petitioner had been discharged eleven years earlier for
refusal to take a loyalty oath, the city board of civil service exam-
iners was given discretion to exclude the petitioner from the civil
service by a local rule making anyone who had been previously dis-
charged from public service ineligible for further employment. In
overturning the decision of the city board, the court apparently
recognized a protectible interest in public employment when it said:
The right which the petitioner seeks to preserve here-that is, the right
to public employment providing that such employment is available and
that she meets all reasonable requirements-is entitled to protection,
at least against deprivation thereof by arbitrary means.
42
The analysis of the above cases indicates that they are based
on the rational relationship standard of substantive due process.
48
These cases seem to make no explicit distinction between public
employment which is terminable at the appointing authority's plea-
sure and that which is subject to termination only for cause. It would
also seem that these decisions do not fall within the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as formulated by the California courts.
44 How-
ever, despite the broad due process language, these cases have not
had the broad application urged by Mr. Justice Tobriner in Bogacki
that every dismissal have at least a minimal foundation in reason.
Instead, these decisions have for the most part been limited to a
narrow range of cases involving dismissals or exclusions based upon
loyalty oaths or the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in connection with loyalty investigations.
45 Thus, these decisions
39 Id. at 558.
40 54 Cal. 2d 61, 351 P.2d 761, 4 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1960).
41 258 Cal. App. 2d 433, 65 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1968).
42 54 Cal. 2d at 63, 351 P.2d at 762-63, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
43 One commentator has said that in these cases the courts have applied the fifth
amendment concept of liberty so as to require that any interference with any 
of the
constitutional guarantees inherent in liberty be supported by sound reason and 
policy.
He states that there is no other way to explain Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183
(1952). Note, Dismissal of Federal Employees-The Emerging Judicial Role, 66
COLUIM. L. REv. 719, 735 (1966).
44 But cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), where the
United States Supreme Court sustained a federal statute restricting the political activities
of federal employees without requiring any showing of a compelling public 
interest.
The condition restricting political activities was upheld as reasonable when considered
in light of the legislative purpose to politically neutralize the government 
service.
45 But see Hollon v. Pierce, 257 Cal. App. 2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967),
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have protected public employees from dismissals only when based
upon a certain type of arbitrariness and, in this sense, bear some
resemblance to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine cases.46
One interpretation of the paradox created by the inconsistencybetween the broad language of Wieman and its rather limited appli-cation was suggested in Birnbaum v. Trussell.41 In that case, a phy-sician was discharged from a city hospital on grounds of racial biaswithout having been apprised of the specific nature of the charges
against him. In holding that the dismissal was actionable under afederal statute giving a civil action for deprivation of constitutional
rights, the court went on to interpret the Wieman series of cases.The court stated that, although government employment is no morethan a privilege, a discharge for disloyalty may involve such legalrights as those in reputation and eligibility for other employment.The court made it clear that, "whenever there is a substantial inter-
est, other than employment by the state, involved in the discharge
of a public employee, he can be removed neither on arbitrary grounds
nor without a procedure calculated to determine whether legitimategrounds do exist." '48 The court stated that this principle had its
most widespread application in cases of accusations of disloyalty,but that a similar "badge of infamy" would be imputed from charges
of racial prejudice. Thus, under the Birnbaum analysis, a publicemployee's interest in not being dismissed is afforded due processprotection at least when it involves additional factors of reputation
and eligibility for future employment.
The courts have also considered the nature of a public em-ployee's interest in his government job in a series of cases which
speak in terms of the requirements of procedural due process.4 0 In
where the court applied the substantive due process rationale in questioning the dis-missal of a public employee on grounds of unreliability. The court, however, qualifiedthe impact of its reasoning by pointing out that the employer school district did notclaim the authority to dismiss at its pleasure and that the employee was entitled toretain his position unless good cause could be shown.46 One writer has interpreted Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551(1956), as requiring a hearing only when a public employee is dismissed for engagingin a constitutionally protected act. O'Neill, Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: TheWelfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 SuP. CT. REv. 161, 205.
47 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
48 Id. at 678.
49 For a review of federal cases see United States v. Rasmussen, 222 F. Supp. 430(D. Mont. 1963) and 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIV LAW TREATISE § 7.13, at 463-73 (1958).It is important to note at this point the complementary nature of the concepts ofsubstantive and procedural due process. Where a court recognizes the procedural rightsto notice and hearing, it implicitly recognizes the existence of some substantive interestwhich cannot be arbitrarily taken away or denied. Substantive due process involves therecognition of the protectible interest. Procedural due process concerns the procedures
which are required to protect that interest.
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Vitarelli v. Seaton,5° the United States Supreme Court invalidated
the suspension of a public employee who was considered by the
government to be a security risk. The suspension determination was
made at a hearing where no evidence was adduced in support of the
charges and no witnesses testified. The decision, however, was based
on the narrow grounds that the agency could not legally disregard
hearing procedures which it had voluntarily adopted and which were
embodied in departmental regulations. In another case, Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy,51 the Court considered the consti-
tutional right of a worker on a military installation not to be ex-
cluded from the installation as a security risk without a hearing.
52
In arriving at its decision, the Court defined the requirements of
due process in terms of a balancing formula:
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the pre-
cise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action.
53
In applying this formula, the Court denied the worker relief on the
grounds that the government action, which involved the traditional
power of a military commander to control access to his installation,
only affected the right to work at one specific installation and that a
"badge of infamy" such as existed in the Wieman case was not in-
volved. 54
The Court in Cafeteria applied the "balancing formula" in a
way which affords very little protection to the public employee from
the loss of one specific job. However, a federal court in a more re-
cent decision applying the Cafeteria balancing test,55 held that a
nontenured professor was entitled to a hearing and to minimal fac-
tual support and bases for nonretention before being denied tenure
by the state. The court stated that denial of tenure in the case of
a university professor would be a serious impediment to employment
50 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
51 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
52 Cf. Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961): "One may not
have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Government may not prohibit
one from going there' unless by means consonant with due process of law."
5 367 U.S. at 895.
54 Id. at 896-99.
55 Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d
806 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 909 (1971). But see Orr v. Trinter, 444
F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), where the court held that government employment is neither
life, liberty, nor property within the due process clause. The court held that a teacher's
interest in knowing reasons for nonrenewal of his teaching contract and in confronting
the board of education on those reasons is not sufficient to outweigh the interest of the




elsewhere. 6 The court emphasized that the standards for dismissal
could be less severe for nontenure than for tenure, but that no in-terest was served in allowing a wholly arbitrary decision. Thus, whenthere may be serious detriment to the career of a public employee,
the balance shifts. Under such circumstances, due process requires
a hearing to determine if there is factual support for the decision.
It can be seen from the above analysis that the courts have
applied varying standards in defining the legally protectible inter-
ests of public employees under the due process clause. Application
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which is adopted by the
majority in Bogacki, would seem to provide very little practicalprotection to public employees in Mr. Bogacki's position. As pointed
out by Justice Tobriner in his dissent,5" the majority undermines
much of the practical protection they purport to afford employees'
exercise of specific constitutional rights via the unconstitutional con-ditions doctrine. The majority does this by permitting an employerto discharge an employee for no reason at all, putting the burden
upon the employee to prove a constitutionally impermissible reason
was involved. Greater protection would be afforded the public em-ployee when a test similar to the formulation in the Birnbaum caseis applied." It would seem that the action of the review board inBogacki would satisfy the Birnbaum standards. Mr. Bogacki wasgiven a hearing at which he was vindicated of all charges and made
eligible for future employment. This would seem to remove all
stigma from his dismissal. Realistically speaking, however, we can
only speculate as to the actual impact that Mr. Bogacki's dismissal
will have on his future employment opportunities. The mere fact
of dismissal may seriously hamper his attempt to secure future em-ployment. In addition, it may be difficult for the employee to locate
a job comparable to the one he has lost.
It would seem that the only way to secure truly adequate pro-
tection from arbitrary deprivation of public employment would beto recognize a legally protectible interest in a public employee'sposition. Such an interest would involve a requirement that employeedismissals be founded upon legitimate reasons. The adoption of such
a substantive due process standard would require a much wider ap-plication of the Wieman rationale than is presently the practice in
court decisions dealing with the dismissal of public employees. This
would involve recognition that the reasonableness standard is notlimited to cases involving loyalty oaths and self-incrimination but
also applies to dismissals under other circumstances.
56 310 F. Supp. at 978.
57 5 Cal. 3d at 798, 489 P.2d at 556, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (dissenting opinion).58 See text accompanying notes 47-48, supra.
[Vol. 1
DUE PROCESS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Review of Administrative Arbitrariness
Justice Tobriner criticizes the holding of the court in Bogacki
as bestowing upon employers an absolute discretion to dismiss,
thereby denying employees any opportunity for review of admin-
istrative arbitrariness. 9 While Justice Tobriner recognizes the need
for a broad discretion in employers to determine the fitness of
employees, he believes that the judiciary may exercise a limited
review to ensure that employers do not abuse their discretion by
making decisions which are unsupported by legitimate reason." He
goes on to say that, when an employee is discharged arbitrarily, the
courts must remain open to afford relief.6"
The position taken by Justice Tobriner raises the question as
to what extent due process requires judicial review of administrative
discretion which adjudicates important interests such as the reten-
tion of a government job. The scope and extent of the constitutional
right to judicial review of administrative action appears to be a
matter of continuing controversy. It has been difficult to formulate a
governing constitutional principle defining the extent to which
judicial review is required. 2 A review of case law reveals that the
Constitution may sometimes require a limited review and may
sometimes permit denial of all review.' Some cases seem to indicate
that if an administrative agency makes a determination concerning
constitutional rights and such determination would be deemed
confiscatory and therefore a violation of substantive due process,
that procedural due process would guarantee judicial review."
Various commentators have expressed their opinions as to the
constitutional dimensions of a right to judicial review of administra-
tive action. Professor Jaffe concludes that whenever "a person is
the object of an administrative order which will be enforced by a
writ levying upon his property or person, he is at some point entitled
to a judicial test of legality."6 5 He points out, however, that this
right to judicial review becomes less certain as the interest involved
becomes less concrete.66 Such an interest may be protected from ar-
59 5 Cal. 3d at 802, 489 P.2d at 559, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (dissenting opinion).
'0 Id.
61 Id. at 803, 489 P.2d at 560, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
62 See, e.g., 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.19, at 101-07 (1958).
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
65 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 384 (1965). Some
courts have held that where there is no vested property right involved, judicial review
may be denied. For instance, in City of Amarillo v. Hancock, 150 Tex. 231, 239 S.W.
2d 788 (1951), it was held that the legislature could properly deny judicial review of
the dismissal of a fireman since he had no vested property right in his position.
66 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 386 (1965).
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bitrary impairment via the concept of substantive due process, but
a statute may constitutionally cut off review of administrative dis-
cretion which affects that interest. Such is the case if the limitation
on review is reasonable in light of the competing interests con-
cerned. 7 The need for administrative efficiency under the circum-
stances and the nature of the interest at stake would be factors tobe considered. Where the interest at stake is a property right, a
statute precluding review would be unreasonable and, therefore, dueprocess would guarantee judicial review. Professor Jaffe recognizes,however, that such a guarantee of judicial review may not belimited to traditional property rights as the class of highly protected
interests is not closed.6"
Another commentator, Professor Rauol Berger, proffers a dif-ferent view. According to him, when an administrator has acted in
excess of his discretionary authority by making an arbitrary deci-
sion, due process requires that his actions remain open to review.69This follows from the basic function of the court which is to standbetween the individual and arbitrary action.70 Professor Berger be-lieves that discretion authorized by law and abuse of discretion aredistinguishable, and that the latter should always remain open to
review by the courts.7 1 This hypothesis is essentially adopted byMr. Justice Tobriner in arguing that the court was constitutionally
required to review Bogacki's dismissal for arbitrariness.
Professor Davis vociferously rejects the stance taken by Pro-fessor Berger.2 According to Professor Davis, abuse of discretion
cannot be reviewed without reviewing the very discretion which is
supposedly bestowed upon the administrative agency. 3 ProfessorDavis insists that the Constitution does not require judicial review
of administrative arbitrariness in all cases and that review may belegislatively restricted even to prevent review of arbitrariness with-
out offending due process. He attributes Professor Berger's analysis
to the mistake of equating lack of authority to act arbitrarily with
67 Cf. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951),
where Justice Frankfurter stated that justiciability "has most often turned on evaluatingboth the appropriateness of the issues for decision by courts and the hardship ofdenying judicial relief."68 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 388 (1965).69 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 CoLU-M. L. REV.55, 73 (1965). See also Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction ojFederal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).70 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 CoLux. L. REv.
55, 57 (1965).71 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 966-68
(1969).
72 Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L.
REv. 643 (1967).
73 Id. at 646, 654 n.36.
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reviewability.' In any case, the majority of the court in Bogacki
ostensibly agrees with Professor Davis insofar as he contends that
administrative arbitrariness or abuse of discretion is not always
reviewable.
The view propounded by Professor Berger and apparently ac-
cepted by Justice Tobriner that due process always guarantees re-
view of administrative arbitrariness would not appear satisfactory.
There may be situations where it is entirely reasonable for the legis-
lature to cut off judicial review of administrative action. Such might
be the case when the legislature gives an elective executive official
the power to appoint and dismiss various advisory and staff person-
nel. In such a case, due to the nature of the positions involved, an
arbitrary power of dismissal may be reasonable.
The fact that a statute precluding judicial review may be rea-
sonable suggests that an analysis similar to the following be adopted.
Due process guarantees review of administrative arbitrariness unless
it can be shown that the limitation on review is reasonable when all
competing interests are balanced. This would involve weighing the
harm which would result from denying review versus the administra-
tive necessity of maintaining an absolute discretion.
75 Applying this
analysis to the situation in Bogacki, it could be argued that due
process would guarantee judicial review at least to determine if
Mr. Bogacki's dismissal was supported by legitimate reason. It
would seem that Mr. Bogacki's position as a building inspector was
technical in nature and his performance on the job capable of
objective evaluation. There do not appear to be any compelling
reasons why an administrator should not be required to document
his reasons for dismissing an employee such as Bogacki. Availability
of a limited review by the courts to determine if a reasonable basis
for such a dismissal does exist would probably not impose an undue
hardship upon the courts or upon the administrative agency. In
addition, recognition of a right to review of arbitrariness in situa-
tions where a man's livelihood is concerned would appear proper in
light of our egalitarian traditions. In those rare job situations where
strong factors can be shown which make judicial review impractica-
ble, legislative and judicially self-imposed restrictions on review
would be proper.
While there is disagreement as to the constitutional requirement
of review, all the above mentioned commentators favor enlarging
74 Id. at 646.
75 See Patton v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 13 Cal. App. 3d 536, 91 Cal. Rptr.
832 (1970), where a similar weighing process was applied in denying a public employee
a right to a hearing or to judicial review of arbitrariness as to a five-day disciplinary
suspension.
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the scope of reviewable action which involves administrative discre-
tion. Professor Jaffe has stated that the function of administration
does not argue against judicial intrusion when the judiciary's roleis limited to questions of illegality and arbitrariness.70  Likewise,
Professor Davis, although he does not believe that it would be salu-
tary to eliminate all instances of absolute discretion, believes more
should be done to eliminate absolute discretion which is unnecessary
or unjustified." It would seem that courts should begin to afford
more frequent review of discretionary acts, such as employee dis-
missals, in the absence of strong factors growing out of the separation
of powers concept which demand nonjusticiability. 8
It appears that the courts in California have the power to re-
view employee dismissals such as that of Mr. Bogacki. California
has enacted a statute which provides for both independent judgment
by the court and a substantial evidence review of the record in the
case of agency decisions claimed to constitute an abuse of discre-
tion.79 In Bixby v. Pierno,8° this provision was interpreted to provide
for independent judgment by the court where vested rights are in-
volved and review by substantial evidence where such rights are
not involved. In that case, the doctrine of separation of powers and
the clause in the California Constitution vesting the judicial powerin the courts were interpreted as providing for both independentjudgment and substantial evidence review for administrative deci-
sions."' Thus, where vested property rights are involved, the court
76 Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401, 407 (1958).
77 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 155 (1969). Professor Davis, while he
argues for a more adequate confinement of discretionary power, believes that theburden on the judiciary should be minimized and that administrative rule making,in the area of welfare administration for instance, is the best vehicle for confining
discretion. Id. at 180.
78 Strong factors growing out of the separation of powers concept which demand
nonjusticiability are illustrated in Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,333 U.S. 103 (1948). In that case, the Court refused to review orders granting ordenying applications of citizens of the United States for authority to engage in over-seas and foreign air transportation which were subject to approval by the President.The Court stated that such decisions were political and not judicial, and were confidedby the Constitution to the political departments of government, executive and legislative.The Court added that such decisions were of a kind for which the judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities nor responsibility. Id. at 111.
79 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West 1955):
Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, incases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judg-
ment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determinesthat the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence, and in all
other cases abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that thefindings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole
record.
80 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971). For a development of
the California case law in this area, see Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d 306, 66 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1968).81 4 Cal. 3d at 141, 481 P.2d at 249, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
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would be authorized to exercise its independent judgment on the
facts as to the correctness of the administrative decision. Where
interests not considered to be vested rights are involved, such as a
public employee's interest in his government job, the court would
be authorized to decide if there was substantial evidence in the rec-
ord to support the decision. In Lunderville v. Emery Unified School
District,2 these principles were applied to review the dismissal of
a local government employee who occupied a probationary status
at the time of his dismissal. Although the applicable provisions of
the education code were interpreted to allow dismissal only for cause,
the court stated:
No right of judicial review is accorded to the employee, except that as
in all cases of review of administrative proceedings by mandamus, a
court may determine whether the board's jurisdiction was exceeded,
whether the hearing was fair, and whether the board's findings were
supported by substantial evidence.88
There appears to be no valid reason to limit the substantial
evidence review which was recognized in the Lunderville case to
employees who are covered by ordinance provisions providing for
dismissal only for cause. In view of the importance of an employee's
government job to his livelihood and the absence of factors requiring
an absolute exercise of discretion by the employer, the courts should
provide employees such a Bogacki at least the limited review afforded
by the substantial evidence rule. Such a limited review would not
interfere with the employer's discretion to determine the competency
of his employees even when a close working relationship between
employer and employee is involved. In such a case, incompatibility
between a supervisor and his employee would be a legitimate reason
supporting a dismissal. It is not an overburdensome demand to re-
quire at least minimal evidentiary support corroborating an em-
ployer's discharge of a public employee.
Due Process Trends and Analogies
Justice Tobriner believes that the majority's failure to provide
due process protection to public employees is inconsistent with the
protection afforded in several closely analogous areas of the law.
His observations would appear to have validity in arguing that
similar protection should be afforded to public employees. Due pro-
cess protection is afforded by the courts where government regulation
affects private employment opportunities such as the granting of
occupational licenses." Protection is also afforded from arbitrary
82 262 Cal. App. 2d 459, 68 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1968).
83 Id. at 466, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
84 E.g., Willner v. Comm. on Character, 373 US. 96 (1963).
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exclusions from labor unions85 and expulsions from professional
associations8" where such exclusions or expulsions will seriously
hamper an applicant's livelihood. Equally as relevant are court
decisions restricting the government's authority to arbitrarily deny
various types of government largess such as welfare benefits 7 and
education at a state college.88 There is also a trend of recent deci-
sions toward affording procedural due process whenever an indi-
vidual's important interests are affected by government action.8 9
Prior notice and a hearing are required in situations involving in-
terests probably less important than the loss of a public employee's
job such as the suspension of a driver's license,"0 the prejudgment
repossession of personal goods,' and the prejudgment attachment
of property."
These various interests mentioned by Justice Tobriner might
possibly be distinguished from public employment on the grounds
that they involve vested property rights, government regulation of
private activities, or matters of statutory entitlement, such as wel-
fare payments. However, it would appear that these interests are
sufficiently analogous to render an arbitrary power over public em-
ployment inconsistent with the substantive and procedural protec-
tions afforded in these other areas. It would seem that a legally
protectible interest should also be recognized in public employment
at least to the extent that it should not be taken away without legiti-
mate reason or without the opportunity for a meaningful hearing.
CONCLUSIONS
Justice Frankfurter once made the following observation con-
cerning the nature of due process:
Due process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which
85 E.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
86 E.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969).
87 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); accord, Wheeler v. Montgomery,
397 U.S. 280 (1970); McCullough v. Terzian, 2 Cal. 3d 647, 470 P.2d 4, 87 Cal. Rptr.
195 (1970). See also, McLeod v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 14 Cal. App. 3d 23,
94 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1970), where no distinction was made between a disability pension
and a legal right. The court held that an administrative agency must issue a subpoena
for witnesses when requested by a party whose legal rights the agency will determine
at a hearing.
88 Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal. App. 3d 873,
88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970).
89 Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 804-07, 489 P.2d 537, 560-63,
97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 680-83 (1971).
90 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
91 Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
92 Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971).
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rights have heretofore been found to have been curtailed for want of
procedural fairness. . . . While it contains the garnered wisdom of the
past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not
confined to past instances.93
With this thought in mind, the courts should begin to recognize
that there is a protectible interest in public employment which should
be brought within the protections afforded by substantive and pro-
cedural due process. A public employee should not be deprived of his
government job arbitrarily or without legitimate reason. It has not
been shown that a limited review by the courts of employment de-
cisions would interfere with the proper exercise of administrative
discretion in most modern employment situations.
Recognition of the above principles would entail a rejection by
the California courts of the line of decisions which permit an em-
ployee who serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority to be
dismissed without cause and without notice or hearing. 4 The courts
would have to take a broader view of the protection afforded by
the substantive due process rationale developed in the Wieman
case and its progenyf 5 This protection must be viewed as proscrib-
ing the termination of government employment without a demon-
strable and reasonable justification. The holding and rationale of
the California Supreme Court in Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors96
prevents the recognition of any such protection for public employees




At the time that this note went to press, the United States
Supreme Court was rendering decisions in Board of Regents v.
Roth97 and Perry v. Sindermann.9" The holdings and rationales in
these two cases arguably could preclude a reconsideration of the
Bogacki decision by this writer. This addendum is included to give
a brief synopsis of those decisions and their impact upon the
issues discussed in this note.
The Roth case, discussed earlier in this note,99 involved the
93 Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 173-74 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
94 Cases cited note 18 supra.
95 Cases cited note 32 supra.
96 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971).
97 Board of Regents v. Roth, 40 U.S.L.W. 5079 (U.S. June 29, 1972) (No. 71-
162), rev'g 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
98 Perry v. Sindermann, 40 U.S.L.W. 5087 (U.S. June 29, 1972) (No. 70-36).
99 See text accompanying notes 55-56, supra. The opinions of the District Court
and Court of Appeals are cited at note 55, supra.
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refusal by the Regents to renew the teaching contract of a non-
tenured state university professor. The District Court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, had weighed the interest of the University
in denying re-employment summarily versus the interest of the
teacher in retaining his employment, and decided that he was en-
titled to a statement of reasons for nonretention and a hearing at
which he could challenge those reasons. The United States Supreme
Court rejected the holdings of the lower courts, explaining that, prior
to the application of any weighing process to determine the require-
ments of procedural due process, a protected interest Within the
fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property must be
implicated. Although the Court recognized that the distinction be-
tween rights and privileges or benefits had been discarded, it stated
that the words liberty and property had certain boundaries. The
Court then went on to say that no interest in liberty or property was
implicated here. There was no evidence of any charges which would
be damaging to reputation and no definitive proof of damage to
career opportunities. The Court stated that an interest must be
established which amounts to at least a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment. Such a claim must arise from existing rules and understand-
ings from an independent source such as state law. In this case, the
Court asserted, the terms of employment supported no possible claim
of entitlement.
In the Sindermann case, the Court added to what it had said
in Roth. This case involved the nonrenewal of the contract of a
nontenured state college professor who had been teaching for 10
years under a series of one-year contracts. The Court adopted a
position similar to the California Supreme Court under the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine'00 by holding that lack of tenure did
not deprive the public employee of the right to a hearing when the
allegations presented a bona fide first amendment claim. Aside from
the allegation of a bona fide claim concerning the infringement of
collateral constitutional rights, however, the Court reaffirmed the
views expressed in Roth. In doing so, the Court discussed the nature
of the interest in a benefit which would be sufficient to entitle such
benefit to due process protection. Such an interest must arise from
rules or understandings which support a claim of entitlement to the
benefit. In the case of a nontenured college professor, a mere sub-jective expectancy of tenure would not be enough, but allegations of
a de facto tenure policy arising from officially promulgated under-
standings would entitle him to a hearing.
The rationale of the Court in Roth and Sindermann appears to
be closely analogous to the rationale of the California Supreme
100 See text accompanying notes 21-29, supra.
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Court in Bogacki and therefore subject to many of the same criti-
cisms. The Court pays lip service to the demise of the right-privilege
distinction, yet restricts the due process protection afforded to
public employees. This protection is restricted by hinging the
existence of a protectible interest upon the terms of employment or
upon implied understandings or agreements. The Court thus avoids
a realistic appraisal of the nature of the job involved and the public
employee's actual interest in retaining that job. The Court's ap-
proach would enable the state to authorize arbitrary dismissals by
including such a power in the terms of employment. The correct
approach would seem to be to recognize due process protection for
public employment except in those rare job situations where a
restriction on review would be reasonable.1 1
Mr. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Roth, recog-
nized the restrictive view which the Court had taken of the pro-
tectible interest under the due process clause. Justice Marshall, with
whom this writer agrees, contended that the Constitution restrains
government from acting arbitrarily with respect to employment
opportunities which it offers or controls. Every applicant should be
entitled to a job unless the government can establish some reason
for denying it. It is not an intolerable burden to give reasons where
reasons exist.
Even though the views expressed by Mr. Justice Marshall and
this writer would not seem to be acceptable to the current United
States Supreme Court majority, it should be reiterated that Cali-
fornia does have a statute which authorizes court review of agency
decisions to determine if there has been an abuse of discretion. 10 2
Where vested rights are not involved, this statute authorizes a
substantial evidence review by the courts. It could be argued that
this is an independent source of state law which creates a legitimate
claim of entitlement under the Roth standards to an interest in one's
government job. In any case, it appears that the California courts
are authorized to overturn administrative decisions which are not
based on substantial evidence and therefore amount to an abuse of
discretion.
101 See text accompanying note 75, supra.
102 See note 79 and accompanying text, supra.
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